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Abstract 
Social protection programs are underway to help assist individuals, households, and 
communities to better manage risk as well as to provide support to the chronically 
poor. In pre-crisis Indonesia, formal social protection programs hardly existed and 
most  social protection was achieved through informal arrangements. Hence, when 
Indonesia sank into a deep crisis in 1988 which had a severe social impact, the 
government had no choice but to create new social safety nets instead of expanding 
existing ones. These newly launched social safety net programs provide valuable 
lessons for the design and implementation of social protection programs in other 
developing countries context. 
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I.  Introduction 
Prior to the Asian crisis, Indonesia had one of the most rapid growth 
experiences of any country in the world.  That rapid economic growth had broad 
based benefits and was accompanied by significant improvements in living standards: 
poverty — by any standard — fell dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1996 
the proportion of the population living below the official poverty line fell by almost 
50 percentage points (from 60 percent to 11 percent). Infant mortality rates fell, 
school enrollment rates rose, and the provision of basic infrastructure facilities — 
water, roads, electricity — expanded significantly. In fact, Indonesia was considered 
to be one of the most successful countries in the endeavor to reduce poverty.  
On the other hand, Indonesians had never relied heavily on government safety 
net programs, and wisely so.  The country has neither the economic apparatus nor the 
political mechanism required to deliver large scale, widespread, transfer programs. 
Social spending was largely focussed on ‘social services’, with the family and 
communities providing ‘social insurance’. Exceptions to this are social security 
schemes mandated for employees in medium and large enterprises (Jamsostek), public 
service (Taspen), the military (Asabri), and health insurance for employees (Askes).
1
 
As events evolved during the crisis, these schemes proved ineffective as forms of 
social protection for the majority of population, simply because they excluded most of 
the population, particularly the poor. In addition, there were also some subsidized 
health schemes, but Indonesia did not have a social safety net system like the one 
which exists today. Establishing the social safety net in Indonesia in 1998 was 
therefore more of a case of casting a new net rather than expanding an existing one. 
The outbreak of the Indonesian crisis in late 1997 has forced Indonesian 
households to adjust to the first serious economic contraction in years. Throughout 
1998 real economic growth was –13.7 percent.2 This was a sharp turn around from the 
high growth of the previous three decades, which averaged over 7 percent annually. 
The social impact of this large economic contraction was also substantial. The poverty 
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rate increased by 164 percent from the immediate pre-crisis level in mid 1997 to the 
peak of the crisis by the end of 1998.
3
 In the labor market, even though the open 
unemployment rate slightly only increased from 4.7 percent in August 1997 to 5.5 
percent in August 1998, real wages fell by around one third during the same period.
4
 
One year later, real wage growth has returned to positive in most sectors, but the 
unemployment rate has continued to climb, reaching 6.4 percent by 1999. 
Therefore, the response of the government to the impending social impact of 
the crisis was to launch the so-called social safety net programs in early 1998. These 
are a set of new as well as expanded initiatives widely known as the “JPS” programs, 
an acronym of the Indonesian term for social safety net, Jaring Pengaman Sosial.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two revisits the 
discussions on the social impact of the crisis. Section three reviews the newly 
established social safety net programs and the methods of targeting used as a response 
to the crisis. Section four examines the performance of these social safety programs. 
Section five discusses the interactions between those JPS programs where there has 
been significant involvement with community and sectoral programs.  Finally, section 
six summarizes the lessons learned from the social safety net and poverty reduction 
programs and concludes the discussion with some policy recommendations.  
  
II.  Background to the Indonesian Crisis  
Throughout 1998, Indonesia was mired in a deep political and economic crisis. 
The crisis in the financial sector was one of the worst in the world’s modern history, 
requiring half of Indonesia’s total GDP to fix as loan recovery rates revealed massive 
losses. The value of the Indonesian rupiah plummeted from a pre-crisis level of 
approximately Rp 2,500 per US dollar to around Rp 15,000 in mid 1998. The crisis 
resulted in a 13.7 percent drop in real GDP in 1998.  The construction sector was 
severely hit (-39.8 percent), followed by the financial sector (-26.7 percent), trade, 
hotels and restaurants (-18.9 percent). Meanwhile, the agricultural and utility sectors 
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continued to experience small positive growth at around 0.2 and 3.7 percent 
respectively.  
The economic crisis has also tremendous impact on inflation which reached 78 
percent in 1998, where food prices escalated by an estimated 118 percent in the same 
period. These price increases and related food shortages strongly affected the poor. 
For example, on average health expenditure declined by 20.5 percent at the height of 
the crisis. Household expenditures on health declined even faster than overall 
expenditures — the share of overall spending going to healthcare decreased by 14 
percent for urban and 40 percent for rural households. 
 
A.  The Poverty Rate, Characteristics of the Poor, and Vulnerability 
There have been several studies to assess the impact of the crisis on the life of 
households throughout Indonesia.
5
 Data gathered by the Government Bureau of 
Statistics in a survey known as SUSENAS in 1996 and 1999 indicated that the crisis 
has resulted in a substantial increase in poverty.
6
 According to one estimate the 
national poverty rate increased from 15.7 percent in February 1996 to 27.1 percent in 
February 1999.
7
 The number of urban poor has doubled, while we have seen a 75 
percent increase in the number of rural poor. A study tracking poverty over the course 
of the crisis is shown in Figure 1. It indicates that the poverty index increased from 
100 just before the crisis in mid 1997 to 264 at the peak of the crisis by the end of 
1998.
8
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Figure 1:  Estimates of Poverty in Indonesia During the Crisis 
Source:  Suryahadi et al (2000) 
 
The poor tend to have low education, work in agriculture, and live in rural 
areas. Eighty seven percent of the poor live in households in which the head of 
household has a primary school education or less, while only 5 percent of the poor 
have a secondary school education or better. Almost 60 percent of the poor are in 
households where agriculture is the main source of income (whether from labor or 
land). Even though the “modern” sector has a quarter of all workers, they only have 
15 percent of the poor.  In keeping with that, fully three quarters of the poor live in 
rural areas.
9
 
Determining exactly who should be classified as “the poor” is a difficult  task 
since who the poor are at any point in time is very fluid and households enter and exit 
periods of poverty frequently. In Table 1 we reproduce a poverty transition matrix 
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from Skoufias et al (2000).
11
 Although during the crisis many of the households that 
were marginally poor before the crisis became impoverished, the transition matrix 
reveals considerable fluidity. Approximately 31 percent of the poor in 1997 moved 
out of poverty in 1998, although mainly to the category of near poor (17.52 percent). 
Also, 44.53 percent of the near poor in 1997 became poor in 1998, but there were also 
17 percent which managed to become non-poor. But more surprisingly, almost 17 
percent of poor households in 1998 were near non-poor and more than a quarter 
(26.24 percent) were non-poor in 1997. These are the households which in 1997 had 
expenditures more than 25 and 50 percent above the poverty line respectively. Only 
35 percent of the poor in 1998 are those who were also poor in 1997. This implies that 
reaching the poor in 1998 will be difficult, as many families who otherwise would not 
have been at all poor have suffered large reversals of fortune during the crisis and has 
become poor. 
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Table 1. Poverty Transition Matrix 
 
Total 1997 
Poverty Status in 1998 
Poor Near Poor 
Near Non-
Poor 
Non-Poor 
 Total 1998 8,141 1,997 1,369 1,213 3,562 
 - row percentage 100.00 24.53 16.82 14.90 43.75 
 - column percentage 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 - total percentage  100.00 24.53 16.82 14.90 43.75 
 
P
o
v
er
ty
 S
ta
tu
s 
in
 1
9
9
7
 
Poor 1,010 697 177 78 58 
- row percentage 100.00 69.01 17.52 7.72 5.74 
- column percentage 12.41 34.90 12.93 6.43 1.63 
- total percentage  12.41 8.56 2.17 0.96 0.71 
Near Poor 988 440 239 140 169 
- row percentage 100.00 44.53 24.19 14.17 17.11 
- column percentage 12.14 22.03 17.46 11.54 4.74 
- total percentage  12.14 5.40 2.94 1.72 2.08 
Near Non-Poor  1,114 336 282 190 306 
- row percentage 100.00 30.16 25.31 17.06 27.47 
- column percentage 13.68 16.83 20.60 15.66 8.59 
- total percentage  13.68 4.13 3.46 2.33 3.76 
Non-Poor  5,029 524 671 805 3,029 
- row percentage 100.00 10.42 13.34 16.01 60.23 
- column percentage 61.77 26.24 49.01 66.36 85.04 
- total percentage  61.77 6.44 8.24 9.89 37.21 
Notes: 
Poor: PCE < PL, Near Poor: PL  PCE < 1.25*PL,  
Near Non-Poor: 1.25*PL  PCE <1.5*PL, Non-Poor: PCE  1.5*PL 
PCE = Per capita expenditure, PL = Poverty line 
Source:  Skoufias et al (2000) 
 
This also means that a large swath of the Indonesian population that is today 
not poor is nevertheless “at risk” of poverty. Any adverse shock to their incomes (or 
necessary expenditures) could easily force them under the line into poverty. Even if 
only 27 percent of population are poor now, between 30 and 60 percent of population 
are vulnerable to poverty over a three-year horizon. Furthermore, vulnerability to 
poverty varies across population groups. Table 2 reproduces estimates of vulnerable 
population across various groups of population from Pritchett et al (2000).
12
 The table 
reveals the following: households headed by a female are more vulnerable to poverty 
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than households headed by a male, the lower the education level of a household head 
the more vulnerable the household is to poverty, rural households are more vulnerable 
to poverty than urban households, while among rural households the landless are more 
vulnerable to poverty than landed households. Finally, households in the agriculture 
sector have a much higher degree of vulnerability to poverty than households in other 
sectors. 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of poverty and vulnerability across groups 
 
 
 
Mean of log 
percapita 
expenditures 
in the initial 
period 
Headcount 
poverty 
rate (%) 
Yearly 
coefficient 
of variability 
Average 
vulnerability 
for three 
annual shocks 
Headcount 
vulnerable 
rate (%) 
Ratio of 
vulnerable 
to poor 
By gender:       
a. Male 10.9009 20.50 0.0392 0.3899 47.11 2.30 
b. Female 10.9071 21.23 0.0440 0.4410 50.97 2.40 
       
By education:       
a. Less than primary 10.6840 32.04 0.0404 0.6611 64.94 2.03 
b. Primary 10.8279 21.15 0.0381 0.4624 49.67 2.35 
c. Lower secondary 11.0430 10.06 0.0399 0.2544 34.20 3.40 
d. Upper secondary & higher 11.3333 4.24 0.0399 0.0783 17.69 4.17 
       
By urban-rural:       
a. Urban 11.1640 7.93 0.0405 0.1697 29.10 3.67 
b. Rural 10.7284 28.88 0.0389 0.5963 59.17 2.05 
       
By land owning (rural households only):      
a. Landless 10.4631 58.30 0.0318 0.8732 75.74 1.30 
b. Landed 10.7325 28.42 0.0390 0.5919 58.87 2.07 
       
By sector:       
a. Agriculture 10.6567 33.76 0.0389 0.6837 65.79 1.95 
b. Industry 10.9881 15.24 0.0381 0.2812 39.77 2.61 
c. Trade 11.0661 10.55 0.0416 0.2575 36.33 3.44 
d. Services 11.1270 9.46 0.0399 0.1867 30.50 3.22 
Source:  Pritchett et al (2000) 
 
B.  The Impact of the Crisis on Labor Market  
The crisis has also had tremendous effect on the labor market. Open 
unemployment continued to rise slightly, from 4.7 percent in 1997, to 5.5 percent in 
1998, and to 6.4 percent in 1999. The decline in real wages, however, has been far 
more important than unemployment in channeling the impact of the contraction in the 
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labor market.
13
 Nevertheless, recent estimates of real wages by sector provide some 
hope. For most sectors we observe a substantial — more than 10 percent — increase 
in real wages between 1998 and 1999, except for the agriculture and mining sectors 
where real wages has continued to drop by 4 percent and 16 percent respectively.   
Another component of the impact of the crisis on the labor market has been 
shifts in employment for women. Many factories in the modern sector which 
employed young, mostly unmarried, women were hit particularly hard during the 
crisis. However, in many households with children women have to take on additional 
paid work. As a result the fraction of women in the labor force in certain areas has 
actually risen. Finally, there have been various reports in certain rural areas about 
changes in migration patterns that have affected the labor market, so that certain 
agricultural tasks which were previously dominated by women are now being 
performed by men.   
 
C.  Coping Strategies 
It is important to understand that people are not merely passive victims of the 
Indonesian crisis, but have found ways to cope with the impact of these events by 
using their own initiatives, and also by relying on their families, friends, communities, 
and also (to varying degrees) by accessing government programs. A survey in 
December 1998 asked about how they had coped with the crisis. The results revealed 
three main strategies: reducing expenditures, borrowing, and attempting to raise 
incomes.
14
 In reducing expenditures, non-necessities were cut most frequently: 
clothing (68 percent) and recreation (53 percent) were the most frequently cut.  Then 
followed by necessary expenses, such as reducing the quality of foods (52 percent) 
and reducing transportation expenses (48 percent).  Another 38 percent of the poor 
(but only 22 percent of non-poor) were even forced to reduce the quantity of food 
consumed. A second option for the poor was to maintain necessary expenditures by 
borrowing or selling assets.  The most frequent means to achieve this was to borrow 
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from others, a method adopted by almost a third of the poor (and a quarter of the non-
poor) during the crisis. The third option was trying to raise incomes.  In a flexible 
labor market, this can be achieved by taking additional jobs, working longer hours, or 
increasing the number of members of the family who are working. 
 
III.  The Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs 
A. Social Safety Net Programs as a Response to the Crisis 
At the onset of the Indonesian crisis, concern was raised over whether the 
considerable achievements that had been made in the health and education and in 
poverty reduction over the previous decades would be sustained. The Indonesian 
government reacted quickly and put in place a number of measures aimed at 
safeguarding real incomes as well as providing access to social services for the needy. 
Several new programs were launched, 
15
 which were intended to help protect the 
those who were already poor before the crisis as well as the newly poor as a result of  
the crisis through the following four strategies:  
(a) ensuring the availability of food to the poor at affordable prices,  
(b) supplementing purchasing power among poor households through employment 
creation,  
(c) preserving access of the poor to critical social services such as health and 
education, and  
(d) sustaining local economic activity through regional block grant programs and 
extension of small-scale credit.  
Table 3 recapitulates the areas and programs of this recently established Indonesian 
social safety net system. 
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Table 3. Areas and Programs of the Indonesian Social Safety Net 
Safety Net Area Program 
Food security Cheap rice program (OPK): sales of 
subsidized rice to targeted households 
Employment creation Padat Karya: a loose, uncoordinated collection 
of several ‘labor intensive’ programs operated 
through several government departments 
PDM-DKE: a ‘community fund’ program 
providing block grants directly to villages for 
either public works or as a revolving fund for 
credit 
Education Scholarships and Block Grants: providing  
 Scholarships directly to elementary (SD), 
junior secondary (SLTP), and senior 
secondary (SMU) students 
 Block grants to selected school. 
Health JPS-BK: a program providing subsidies for  
 Clinical services 
 Nutrition 
 Midwife services 
 
The programs launched to address the above areas were designed by the 
central government and were intended to have the following characteristics: quick 
disbursement, direct financing to beneficiaries, transparency, accountability, and 
widespread participation. However, as has been revealed by various studies, these 
intended characteristics have not always been achieved. 
 
B.  Method of Targeting 
In general, the targeting for JPS programs is based on a combination of 
household and geographic targeting. Table 4 summarizes various targeting methods 
that have been adopted. 
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Table 4. Targeting Mechanisms in JPS Programs 
Program and Targeting Method FY 98/99 FY 99/00 
OPK 
(Food Security) 
Geographic None None 
Household BKKBN (Family 
Planning 
Board)list 
BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
PDM-DKE 
(Employment 
creation, 
Community Funds 
for public works, 
Credit) 
Geographic Pre-crisis data Updated with 
Bappenas (national 
planning agency) 
regional data 
Household Local decision 
making 
Local decision 
making 
Padat Karya 
(Employment 
Creation) 
Geographic None, various 
ministries 
Urban areas, based 
on employment 
Household Weak self 
selection 
Self selection 
Scholarship and 
Block grants to 
schools 
Geographic Old data on 
enrollment 
Poverty updated to 
1998 
Household School committees 
following criteria 
School committees 
following criteria 
JPS-BK (Health) Geographic BKKBN pre-
posperous rates 
Updated pre-
posperous estimates 
to 1999 
Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
 
The targeting for some programs is based on a household classification created 
by the National Family Planning Agency (BKKBN). According to this classification, 
households are grouped into four socio-economic status groups: ‘pre-prosperous’ 
(“pra-sejahtera” or PS), ‘prosperous I’ (“sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, and KS III. The 
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KS I to KS III categories are often lumped together as KS category.  In past years, 
eligible recipients for some JPS programs are only PS card holders, but for some 
programs eligibility was extended to include KS I households as well (e.g. OPK). This 
household-based targeting was used mostly for the cheap rice program (OPK) and the 
health program (JPS-BK). 
Padat karya (which means, as an adjective, ‘labor intensive’) is not a single 
program but rather collection of programs which were all aimed at employment 
creation. These programs were created as a response to the threat of burgeoning 
unemployment because of the economic contraction which had forced many firms to 
either lay off workers or shutdown completely.  In accordance with the urban nature 
of the crisis, the initial geographical targets for the first round of “crash” programs in 
FY 1997/98 were directed to urban areas plus some rural areas which had experienced 
harvest failures.   
Following on these ‘crash’ programs, in FY 1998/99 there was a proliferation of 
employment creation programs (padat karya) with more than a dozen in this category.  
These programs can be classified into four types.  First, some were on-going 
investment and infrastructure projects which were re-designed as labor-intensive 
projects. Second, other program, such as the Kecamatan Development Project, the 
Village Infrastructure Project, and PDM-DKE Community Fund Program gave block 
grants to local communities. These programs were directed to poor areas, and 
contained ‘menus’ that included the possibility of using funds for public works with a 
labor creating effect. A third set of programs were those special labor intensive 
schemes carried out by sectoral ministries (e.g. retraining of laid-off workers by the 
Ministry of Manpower). A fourth type of program were those ‘food for work’ 
programs, typically launched by international donors and NGOs in drought stricken 
areas.   
Unlike the food security program, those labor intensive programs were quite 
diverse. Although specific programs were targeted to certain areas (e.g. drought 
areas), lack of coordination meant there was little or no systematic overall geographic 
targeting. Within programs there were no clear guidelines about the intended 
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participants; nor were there any fixed administrative criteria to select beneficiaries.  
Hence, targeting was primarily through self-selection: only those who were willing to 
work received benefits.  This self-selection mechanism has the advantage over 
administrative criteria of allowing individuals to choose to participate or not and 
creates the possibility of being more flexible to unobserved household shocks than 
administrative criteria.   
Another important JPS program is the scholarships and block grants program 
providing support to poor children and schools. The scholarships provide Rp.10,000, 
Rp.20,000 and Rp.30,000 per month for primary, lower secondary and upper 
secondary school students respectively. These amounts generally cover the cost of 
school fees and can be used for that purpose or to cover other expenses. In choosing 
the recipients of the scholarships, the program combined certain administrative 
criteria including factors such as the family BKKBN status, the size of the family, the 
likelihood of the children to dropping out from school and a school committee 
decision.  The  school committee consisted of the principal, the head teacher, and the 
head of the local parent’s association as the representative of the local community.  
Scholarships funds were first allocated to schools so that “poorer” schools 
received proportionally more individual scholarships. Scholarships were then 
allocated to individual students by school committees, which consisted of the school 
head teacher, the chair of the parents’ association, a teacher representative, a student 
representative, and the village head. School students in all but the lowest three grades 
of primary school were officially eligible. Participating students were to be selected 
from the poorest backgrounds. Committees were required to use household data from 
school records and existing household classifications prepared by BKKBN.  
Scholarships were to be allocated to children from households in the two lowest 
BKKBN rankings. If there were a large number of such eligible students, then 
additional indicators to be applied to identify the neediest students. These additional 
indicators included distance of family homes from school, physical handicaps and 
family size. Also, If possible, half of the total number of scholarships were to be 
allocated to girls. 
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IV.  JPS Program Performance: Problems and Adjustments 
A.  Benefit Incidence of JPS Programs 
 Over the last thirty years Indonesia has become of the most centralized  
countries in the world.  As a result, all of the key social safety net programs were 
centrally designed. Even where programs allowed for local decision making, the 
structure and scope of those local decisions were carefully specified in centrally-
drafted program guidelines.  Despite this, there were huge variations across regions in 
how widely and how well the programs were implemented.
16
  
This section presents some estimates of the effectiveness of the coverage 
among the poor in various JPS programs. The information is based on the findings 
from the latest round of February 1999 SUSENAS conducted by the government’s 
statistics agency (BPS).
17
 Figure 2 shows the coverage among the poor as well as the 
non-poor of six major JPS programs at the district (kabupaten) level. The poor here 
are defined as the poorest 20 percent (first quintile) within each district. Six  JPS 
programs are evaluated: (a) the sale of subsidized rice (OPK), (b) employment 
creation programs  (padat karya), (c) primary school scholarships, (d) junior 
secondary school scholarships, (e) senior secondary school scholarships, and (e) 
health programs. Individual dots in each panel of Figure 1 represent districts, of which 
there are more than 300 throughout Indonesia.  
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Figure 2. Coverage among the Poor and Non-Poor within JPS Programs 
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(c) Coverage of Primary School Scholarship Program
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Coverage among the poor (%)
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
m
o
n
g
 t
h
e
 n
o
n
-p
o
o
r 
(%
)
(d) Coverage of Junior Secondary School Scholarship Program
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(e) Coverage of Senior Secondary School Scholarship
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(f) Coverage of Health Program
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Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the coverage of the food security program (OPK)  
among the poor on the horizontal axis and among the non-poor on the vertical axis. 
Two conclusions immediately emerge. First, coverage among the non-poor highly 
correlates positively with coverage among the poor (the correlation is 0.92) . Districts 
which have low coverage among the poor also have low coverage among the non-
poor, and vice versa, those districts which have high coverage among the poor also 
have high coverage among the non-poor. This means that within districts, the benefits 
of this program have been distributed almost proportionately between the poor and 
non-poor. Only very few districts  specifically favor the poor in the distribution of 
OPK rice, Second, the range in the level of coverage across districts is  very wide, 
almost continuously from near zero to almost 100 percent coverage. This suggests that 
the resources distributed through this program have varied widely across districts.
18
 
Some districts have received a lot of resources, while others have received very little. 
Panel (b), meanwhile, shows that in most districts coverage of employment 
creation through labor intensive programs is low. Coverage of this program among the 
poor in most districts is less than 10 percent and certainly very few districts have a 
program coverage among the poor of more than 20 percent. This highlights the 
difficulties of using employment creation or public works programs to reach out the 
majority of the poor. In terms of distributing the program benefits to the poor vis a vis 
the non-poor,  these programs seems to be on par with the food security program.  
Panels (c), (d), and (e) show the coverage of scholarship programs at the 
primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary levels respectively. During the early 
stage of the crisis, it was feared parents may forced their children out from schools as 
a way to cope with falling incomes and rising costs, hence triggering a large increase 
in school drop-out rates. This program was intended to reach at most 6 percent of 
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 Another possible explanation is that districts which have a very low coverage have actually  received   
similar resources to those districts with a high coverage, but  those resources have been diverted from 
the program objective. However, this can not be confirmed from the available data. 
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primary school students, 17 percent of junior secondary school students, and 10 
percent of senior secondary school students nationwide.  
If these targets have been achieved and all scholarship recipients were from 
the poorest 20 percent of students, then these numbers would have translated into 30 
percent, 85 percent, and 50 percent coverage among the poor. The panels show that 
clearly these targets have not been achieved. In the primary school scholarship 
program, the panel (c) shows that in most districts coverage among poor students is 
less than 10 percent instead of the 30 percent target. Likewise, in junior and senior 
secondary scholarship programs, most districts have coverage among the poor of less 
than 30 percent and 25 percent respectively, instead of the 85 percent and 50 percent 
targets. 
In terms of targeting, the scholarship programs seem to have been more 
effective than food security program and the employment creation programs. 
However, in a  significant number of districts coverage among the non-poor in the 
primary school scholarship program and in particular in the junior secondary 
scholarship programs have also been quite high. The targeting in the senior secondary 
scholarship program is especially interesting. In some districts all the program 
beneficiaries have been non-poor, with missing out completely poor students. In most 
districts, however, the targeting have been actually much better, with significant 
numbers of poor among the program beneficiaries. 
Finally, panel (f) shows the coverage of the JPS health program, which also 
demonstrates the difficulties in reaching out to the majority of the poor. Most districts 
have achieved coverage among the poor of less than 10 percent and very few districts 
have coverage among the poor higher than 20 percent. Nevertheless, compared to 
other JPS programs, the health program seems to have achieved better targeting of 
program recipients. In most districts, coverage among the non-poor remains under 10 
percent, even in those areas where coverage among the poor increased up to 30 
percent. 
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B.  The Varieties of Targeting Experiences 
Targeting the beneficiaries of SSN programs requires detailed administrative 
guidance as well as community involvement if it is to be both effective and socially 
and politically acceptable.  The previous section discussesed the issues of benefit 
incidence and targeting in the JPS programs, suggesting several useful lessons, in 
particular, about the ways in which targeting did, or did not, have the desired effect. 
OPK (Food Security).  The experience of the food security program revealed 
that centrally planned administrative guidelines often proved socially unacceptable at 
the community level. In its first year the eligibility of households to receive OPK rice 
was based on lists of  families classified according to “welfare” status by the BKKBN. 
However, almost as soon as the program began observers noticed that local leaders 
responsible for implementation were not adhering to the list of eligible households, 
but rather distributed the rice amongst a much larger group.  As a result while each 
eligible household was theoretically entitled to 20 kgs, in many cases received lesser 
amount, while other households, which were not officially eligible, also received 
allocation.   
The quantitative findings from SUSENAS data confirm anecdotal reports from 
field studies that there has been pressure from villagers to distribute the OPK rice 
more widely rather than following strictly the allocation criteria.  Many more 
households received rice than were on the eligibility lists, and they received 
substantially less than the official entitlement. The magnitude of those, even in the top 
quintile, receiving the program benefits suggests powerful pressures for uniformity. 
There are three main arguments made by village heads (kepala desa) to justify 
this practice.  First, the official list is not an accurate list of those who are in need, as 
due to the crisis, many households which formerly were not poor are also now in need 
of assistance.  Second, even if the list is accurate, the distinctions drawn are too fine: 
the differences between those households who are entitled and those who are not does 
not justify one group receiving 20 kgs of rice while the remainder receive nothing.  
Third, village heads and community leaders argue that the targeted distribution of this 
central government benefit is inconsistent with the spirit of community solidarity and 
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self-help (gotong royong).  If everyone is expected to contribute their labor to 
community projects, then everyone should also benefit from unexpected outside 
assistance.    
These arguments are quite compelling and raise important questions about the 
structure of “optimal” targeting. It may well be that communities know better than the 
central government and that the BKKBN classification may not capture those who 
truly need the rice within any given community.  Hence it is possible that some of 
what is recorded as going to the “non-eligible” is not really mis-targeting, but is a 
justifiable correction of the official eligibility criteria.  However, it is also possible 
that local social pressures have led to uniform or equal distribution simply as the only 
allocation that is perceived to be ‘fair’.  The danger is that this may result in a simple 
‘equal’ distribution which, given the fixed total amount of rice available, results in a 
lesser benefit for the poor.   
In FY 1999/2000, the procedures for determining eligible households were 
expanded  to allow  for local flexibility and the addition of households to the list, 
combined with  procedure for publicizing such a list (for example, discussion at a 
local open meeting).  This is intended to allow necessary local flexibility while at the 
same time preventing a completely uniform distribution.  
Padat Karya. (Employment creation –labor intensive schemes). In practice, 
there were several problems with  the targeting of these programs. First, the programs 
were not rigorously held to a minimum wage, and in many cases the wage levels were 
increased (or the daily hours reduced for the same payment) to attract workers.  In 
some regions, the wage rate was set at higher rate than the prevailing local wage rate, 
thus inducing those already working to switch jobs or take additional jobs.  Second, 
there is some anecdotal evidence that participants were not actually required to work. 
Field investigations uncovered evidence of “ghost workers,” who were present on the 
records as being paid for the day but not present on the site. Third, reports from the 
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field also indicate other shortcomings in the selection of beneficiaries, such as 
favoritism in giving jobs to close family and friends of local officials.
19
  
PDM-DKE.  (Employment Creation: Community fund for public works or 
revolving credit schemes). The community fund scheme component of this program 
permitted maximum freedom at the local level about the use of funds. The decisions 
about who benefited were left entirely in the hands of the  Village Development 
Committee(LKMD). Since the official guidelines on targeting are sufficiently general,  
almost any decision can be justified as consistent with the program.   
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this type of targeting, and it may 
well be that community consensus at the local level is the best targeting mechanism of 
all.  However, since the PDM-DKE community fund have been implemented as a 
“crisis” program, these “community” decisions were often taken by local officials 
without adequate time for a proper public information campaign, training of program  
implementers, and community consensus building.   When the rapid period for 
implementation is combined with local institutions with little accountability or 
legitimacy - such as the LKMD - this has frequently lead to targeting decisions that 
are the source of great controversy. 
Unfortunately, there is very little statistical data on the targeting of the PDM-
DKE program.
20
 However, from various field studies of the PDM-DKE program it is 
clear that the results have been mixed.  In some locations communities are very 
satisfied with the program which appeared to have reached the poor reasonably well. 
But in many other location the local community has never heard of the program. In 
such cases the funds have gone into the pockets quietly of those connected to the local 
LKMD, such as local officials (RT/RW) who have received “loans” with zero interest 
and no fixed repayment schedule.  
Scholarships: The data from SUSENAS suggest that the scholarship programs 
have been well targeted, in the sense that more of the benefits have reached the poor 
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 Sumarto et al (2000). 
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 This is partly because public information about the program was so poor that attempts in household 
surveys to ask about the program failed to generate any recognition. 
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than the non-poor by an expenditure measure.  However, the targeting is far from 
perfect as, at least according to such a classification, many children from the middle 
quintiles and even some “rich” children have received scholarships.  
These findings on coverage and targeting in the scholarship program raise  
complex issues and revealed the difficulties. Scholarship recipients are supposed to be 
chosen by school level committees comprising school officials as well as parent and 
community representatives and there have been few indications that these procedures 
are not followed.  Therefore, the evidence that the recipients do not match “poverty” 
as it is typically measured, i.e. by per capita consumption expenditures from 
household surveys, could be interpreted in two ways.  The discrepancy could mean 
either that the survey criteria of identifying the needy, while the local committees 
using local knowledge are more effective; or it could mean that the targeting 
procedures have either not been followed or are inadequate method of identifying the 
most needy.   
These alternative explanations cannot be distinguished with the data at hand.  
This obviously highlights the difficulties of ex post evaluation of programs, which 
must be done both on process and on outcomes.  Moreover, this suggests caution in 
over interpreting any single piece of evidence (such as standard targeting and “benefit 
incidence” calculations), but rather taking into account all evidence, internal, 
qualitative, and quantitative in assessing program performance.     
 
V. JPS Interaction with Community Efforts and Sectoral Programs 
Poorly designed JPS programs can weaken those “informal” safety nets 
provided by the family and the local community, as well as undermining existing 
efforts and institutions. The facts are: (a) people have mainly relied on themselves, 
their families, and their local communities and groups to cope with the crisis;  (b) the 
portion of the budget allocated for JPS programs have been quite small and, aside 
from the food security program, only small numbers of people have actually benefited 
and (c) even those benefits  typically only constitute a small fraction of total 
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household expenses. This means that it is important that the formal JPS programs do 
not undermine the much larger and more important existing “informal” safety nets. 
Micro-credit.  An example of the conflict between on-going efforts and JPS 
programs is in the area of micro-credit. Many believe that providing the poor with 
access to credit can be an important means of economic empowerment enabling them 
a sustainable escape from poverty. Long experience has taught several lessons about 
how to implement a micro-credit program successfully: (a) credit should be at cost 
recovering (if not “market”) interest rates, (b) repayments should be maintained, (c) 
credit through group guarantee of repayment is a useful way of ensuring repayment 
and saves on administrative costs — but these groups should be formed around pre-
existing groups or groups with a natural social affinity.  
Some programs, such as the PDM-DKE, have attempted to strengthen the local 
economy through the operation of credit. This credit however, does not specify a fixed 
interest rate, so that in many locations the interest rate have been zero.  The program 
has lent to groups which have been formed just to receive this credit, and the 
repayment terms have not been specified — in fact, in many cases there are no 
repayment terms. 
Many local groups who have been working for years to build sustainable micro-
credit programs, are sharply critical of the new JPS programs providing micro-credit, 
because they have undermined their own efforts. Borrowers who have been told for 
years of the necessity of high interest rates, group solidarity, and timely repayments 
suddenly see others in the community (and not always the worst off) receiving much 
larger amounts of credit with none of those features.
21
   
Employment creation.  Another example is the impact of labor creation 
programs on community self-help activities (gotong royong).  In most communities in 
Indonesia people are expected to contribute a certain amount of time per year to 
activities which benefit the entire community.  Some of the employment-creation 
programs have paid people for activities that are traditionally carried out for free by 
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 The operating manual of the PDMDKE was revised to create higher interest rates and fixed 
repayment periods for the revolving fund for economic activities. 
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the communities as part of the mutual known as ‘gotong royong. Many fear that this  
undermines future community ventures as people would either expect them to be done 
by the government or they expect to be paid.
22
  
During the crisis, one important if under-acknowledged function of the JPS 
programs has been to sustain funding for health and facilities at the lower level 
education.  This, however, is a temporary measure. An “exit strategy” is needed to 
reduce dependency on the JPS programs and reorient efforts to the overall sectoral 
agenda, but in manner which does not jeopardize the funding received indirectly 
through the JPS programs. 
 
VI.  Lessons Learned: How to Establish a Sustainable Social Safety Net 
A.  Lessons Learned 
The Indonesian experience with the establishment and implementation of JPS 
programs provides very useful lessons for designing and implementing social 
protection programs in the context of other developing countries. Below is a list of six 
main lessons learned from the implementation of the JPS programs: 
1) Regional variations in both coverage and targeting efficiency are a persistent 
phenomenon in various programs.  
2) Geographic targeting responding to shocks was hampered by a lack of timely, 
complete, accurate, and acceptable data. This is why reliable information is vital. 
3) The effectiveness of programs depends on local capability, clear targeting criteria 
and a reliable decision-making mechanism.  
4) JPS programs have both a ‘safety rope’ (insurance against shock) and a ‘safety net’ 
(transfer to poor) function. 
5) Spending on social safety nets must rise during time of crisis, since informal coping 
mechanisms are often insufficient. 
6) Expanding formal insurance continues to be a key challenge. 
In addition, there are further lessons to consider arising especially from the 
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 The padat karya programs were eliminated after FY 98/99 and replaced with a single program in 
urban areas carrying out maintenance and small construction). 
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implementation of the employment creation programs: 
7) The lower the wage the more effective the targeting — these will be an element of  
“self selection” since only those in serious difficulty will be willing to work for the 
low wages being offered. 
8) There are often political pressures for higher wages which ultimately destroy the 
fiscal sustainability of such programs. As wages rise the number who want to work 
also rises and either the program must expand to accommodate them (and hence 
break the budget) or jobs are increasingly rationed (destroying the targeting). 
9) It is hard to produce both useful infrastructure and provide emergency employment 
as this mix of objectives do not sit comfortably within the same programs. Despite 
those problems maintaining some small-scale employment scheme may be 
desirable since in the face of the crisis scaling up an existing programs may be 
preferable to stacking a new venture to ensure rapid response. 
 
B.  Some Policy Recommendations 
 Historically, Indonesia has never relied heavily on government safety net 
programs.  Indonesia has neither the economic apparatus nor the political mechanisms 
required to deliver large scale transfer programs throughout the archipelago. Policy 
recommendations on the future development of social protection programs in 
Indonesia as a result of the present study are as follows:  
1) Three primary ways the poor and the vulnerable can be helped to help themselves 
are through: 
(i) developing a thriving economy free of favoritism and one conducive to labor 
intensive activities, with fair access and fair returns to assets (labor, land, 
natural resources, capital),  
(ii) public expenditures on the “basics” — investments in human beings (health 
and education) and investments in the basic infrastructure to create a suitable 
physical environment where the poor can be productive (roads, irrigation, 
water, urban services),  
(iii) public expenditures on well designed community development programs to 
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encourage growth in backward and underdeveloped regions.  
2) There are two groups within society that need additional protection: 
(i) the small group of chronically poor, i.e. those who lack earning power such 
as widows, orphans, and the physically disabled.  For these people “safety 
net” programs that provide some basic income assistance are essential.  
(ii) a much larger group who are subject to life’s vicissitudes: losing a job, 
falling into ill health. These people need a temporary hand — not a safety net 
but a safety trampoline that provides them with a temporary cushion but 
propels them back into productive activity. 
3) In a country as large and diverse as Indonesia, there are always pockets of 
disadvantage, both geographically (including pockets of urban poverty) and 
socially (certain vulnerable groups). These are the people for whom the real 
social safety net of their own resources — family, friends, and community — 
breaks down. These groups need to be reached with special programs aimed at 
the basics: food and nutrition, health care, and shelter.   
4) “Unemployment insurance” and “social security” that will cover the majority of 
workers in Indonesia are still impossible goals because the Indonesian labor 
market remains dominated by the informal sector where there is no record of 
earnings for most workers.  
5) Likewise, “welfare” programs in the forms of direct in-kind or cash transfers to 
poor households are very difficult to develop when income cannot be 
administratively observed to target eligibility.  Politically, the possibilities of 
corruption and abuse are real dangers in launching any program that attempts to 
transfer money — and the larger the amounts the greater the danger.  
6) Therefore, in our view, Indonesia is not yet ready to establish formal sector social 
protection such as exists in developed countries.  A key historical feature of every 
developed country is a massive expansion in the portion of GDP that goes to 
“social” spending to cover the three large risks in a modern economy: Health 
Risks, Unemployment, and Old Age. Indonesia, nevertheless, should start 
preparing for a period of transition, from where these risks are handled informally 
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through family and community to where these are tackled through formal 
structures. 
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